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Dianne L. Rosen***
I. Introduction
The genesis of the Land Use Recodification Project took
place about five years ago, when the Legislative Commission on
Rural Resources held a series of local government symposia at
various places in the state.' A number of issues were presented
to local government officials, whose input was sought as to what
they considered their most pressing problems. As a result, one
fact became clear. Regardless of its position of leadership and
importance among the states, and its appellation as The Empire
State, New York State was near the very bottom in any ranking
dealing with land use issues.
Quite simply, at the state level, New York was paying abso-
lutely no attention to planning and zoning issues, comprehensive
planning, regional planning, or any other land use problems or
solutions2 which were a major part of the agendas of most other
* The Land Use Reform Symposium is dedicated to Mr. Coon, who was in the pro-
cess of writing this article at the time of his death. Mr. Damsky and Dr. Rosen assisted
in completing the article so that it could be included in this symposium issue.
** Special Counsel on Land Use Laws to the New York State Legislative Commis-
sion on Rural Resources; Legal Advisor to the New York Planning Federation. B.A. 1949,
Colgate University; L.L.B. 1952, Cornell Law School.
*** B.S. 1973, Yale University; Ph.D 1984, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1993, Pace Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON RURAL RESOURCES, SUMMARY Op Is-.
SUE Topics FROM REGIONAL LAND USE ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS, APRIL-OCTOBER 1990 i
(Dec. 14, 1990) (supported by The State Advisory Committee on Land Use Statutes)
[hereinafter ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS, 1990].
2. John R. Nolon, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where to
Grow, 13 PACE L. REV. 351, 370-73 (1993). Another commentator has observed that:
New York's zoning enabling legislation has remained virtually unchanged since
their [sic] adoption in 1926. While a number of amendments have been added, the
enabling statutes of the Town Law and Village Law have changed little since the
1
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states.' Nor had any attention been paid to these issues for a
considerable period of time. The only state agency that had been
dedicated to these issues, the Office of Planning Coordination,4
had, in the early 1970's, the temerity to introduce before the
State Legislature (for that time, although it seems not at all rad-
ical today) a sweeping recodification of zoning and planning
laws. In many instances, these proposed laws advocated shifting
the land use authority, in both planning and zoning, from local
governments to a higher level, such as the county, or, in some
instances, the state.
This proposed legislation was based on a planning study
known as Study Document # 4. Study Document # 4 was really
meant to be a study document, not an immediate effort to adopt
sweeping changes in the planning and zoning statutes. Even so,
it drew a swift and vocal reaction from local governments all
over the state. In what was viewed by many as a negative re-
sponse, the State Legislature abolished the Office of Planning
Coordination.' The agency was then replaced, with greatly re-
duced staff and funding, by the Office of Planning Services (the
"OPS"), 7 but the stigma of Study Document # 4 remained. In
1975, this successor agency was also abolished and was not
first statutes were adopted in 1924, utilizing the Standard Zoning Enabling Act.
Obviously, such antiquated enabling statutes do not provide adequate mecha-
nisms for dealing with the complex planning and development problems of today.
Terry Rice, Statutory Changes Provide for Incentive Zoning, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1991, at
40.
3. Douglas R. Porter, Do State Growth Management Acts Make a Difference? Local
Growth Management Measures Under Different State Growth Policies, 24 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1015 (1991). States that had adopted growth management statutes were: Florida
(FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163, 186, 187, 380 (West 1990)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-2, 36-
70, 45-12, 50-8 (Harrison 1973)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 226-1 to -107 (1988));
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4961 (West 1978)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:18A-8 (West 1991)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 197 (1985)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 45-22 (1988)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4300 (1981)); and Washington
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70.350 (Supp. 1990)). See also Porter, supra, at 1017 nn.7,
9; Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Ann R. Danforth, Looking Beyond the City Limits: Regional
Approaches to the Growth Crisis, 22 URB. LAW. 701, 706-10 (1990) (discussing regional
approaches to growth management in California, Oregon, Minnesota and New Jersey).
4. See Act of June 7, 1966, ch. 528, sec. 1, § 547, 1966 N.Y. Laws 630 (repealed
1971).
5. See E. F. Roberts, The New Frontier, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 694-96 (1980).
6. Act of April 2, 1971, ch. 75, sec. 11, 1971 N.Y. Laws 115, 121; see also Roberts,
supra note 5, at 699.
7. Act of April 2, 1971, ch. 75, sec. 1, 1971 N.Y. Laws 115, 115-19 (repealed 1975).
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replaced.'
In 1975, a few survivors of these planning agencies, together
with survivors of other local government agencies which had also
fallen to the budget-cutting axe, were brought into the Depart-
ment of State, and formed a small cadre of local government
experts, including planning and zoning, known as the Division of
Local Government Services.' Since it was formed, this small
group has literally kept advisory services to local governments
alive, by answering inquiries, conducting seminars and appear-
ing at local government conferences. Thus, a handful of people
are performing the function of entire agencies in advising local
government officials of proper zoning procedures, planning de-
vices and other land use matters.
It was this background, and the realization that the state of
New York was paying absolutely no attention to zoning or plan-
ning at any level of government, that led Senator Charles D.
Cook, the Chairman of the Legislative Commission on Rural Re-
sources (the "Commission"), to investigate the possibilities for
bringing New York's antiquated planning and zoning statutes
into the present century.10 The Commission is a bipartisan
panel, composed of state Senators and Assemblymen." In the
past, the Commission had concentrated its efforts on rural edu-
cation and health care.'2 Under the leadership of Executive Di-
rector Ronald C. Brach and with the blessing of the entire Com-
mission, the Recodification Project began its work in 1989.1-
A special counsel, whose career in state government had
mostly been confined to planning and zoning issues," was ap-
pointed to work with the Counsel of the Commission." The next
step was the appointment of an advisory committee."6 As is
8. Act of July 24, 1975, ch. 464, sec. 16, 1975 N.Y. Laws 669, 685.
9. Id. sec. 54, 57, 1975 N.Y. Laws 669, 700-01.
10. Rice, supra note 2, at 40.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS, 1990, supra note 1, at i, iv.
14. The special counsel had been largely associated with the series of state agencies
that had been abolished by the State Legislature. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text.
15. The Counsel of the Commission had served for a number of years as Counsel to
* the Conference of Mayors and was a recognized expert on local government law.
16. ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS, 1990, supra note 1, at i.
1993]
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known by anyone who has ever dealt with a committee, much
less formed one, the ideal is to have a dedicated and knowledge-
able group which is small enough to function while at the same
time large enough to be representative. The Commission started
with an advisory committee of eleven members which soon grew
to forty-three members. Realizing the impossibility of working
effectively with either number, an advisory committee of twenty-
five was finally agreed upon. This group, the State Land Use
Advisory Committee (the "Advisory Committee"), which has
proven to be extraordinarily effective,17 is representative of liter-
ally all the players in what has been called "The Zoning
Game." State agencies such as the Department of State, the
Department of Environmental Conservation, the Department of
Economic Development, and the Office of Rural Affairs are rep-
resented, as are local government groups such as the Association
of Towns, the Conference of Mayors, county planning offices and
the Temporary Commission on Tug Hill.' 9 Also represented are
public and private interest groups such as the American Farm-
land Trust, the Preservation League of New York State, the
American Planning Association, the New York Planning Federa-
tion, the New York State Builders Association and the New
York State Association of Land Surveyors.2" The Government
Law Center of Albany Law School and the State University of
New York at Albany are active participants, as are a number of
17. Charles D. Cook, Legislative Proposals Weighed by Commission, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
17, 1992, at 2. State Senator Cook is the Chairman of the Legislative Commission on
Rural Resources.
18. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES
6-7 (1966); RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED, ch.
4 (1985). The "zoning game" refers to the tensions between parties with conflicting land
use interests, such as between local governments zoning through their police powers and
citizens attempting to zone through initiative or referendum. David G. Andersen, Com-
ment, Urban Blight Meets Municipal Manifest Destiny: Zoning at the Ballot Box, the
Regional Welfare, and Transferable Development Rights, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 519, 520-22
(1991). Initiatives allow citizens to directly propose and enact ordinances and other legis-
lation. Id. at 519 n.5. Referendums allow citizens to veto measures adopted by legislative
bodies. Id. at 519 n.6.
19. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON RURAL RESOURCES, RESTRUCTUR-
ING NEW YORK STATE COMMUNITY PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT STATUTES: 1993 LEG-
ISLATIVE PROPOSALS 2 (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Legislative Proposals].
20. Id.
[Vol. 13:559
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private land use attorneys and planners.21
The remarkable thing is the harmonious, cooperative func-
tioning of the Advisory Committee from its first meeting to the
present time. If a personal note may be interjected here, we per-
ceived at the outset that the recodification effort, besides afford-
ing the chance to finally do something about New York State's
antiquated land use laws, also afforded a chance to write a book.
What we had in mind was something along the lines of Governor
Mario Cuomo's Forest Hills Diary,22 which gave a day-to-day ac-
count of the problems, divisiveness, threats and hostility engen-
dered by the opposing forces engaged in the construction of a
low income housing project. Surely, we thought, a potentially ex-
plosive mix of developers, environmentalists, land use planners,
local government groups, attorneys, state agencies' legislative
staffers and others would certainly give rise to the same hostili-
ties, late night phone calls and veiled threats, and perhaps open
warfare would surface.
Suffice it to say that none of the above has ever happened.
At the end of the first four monthly meetings, we had much less
than one full page of notes, and that personal part of the project
was reluctantly, but thankfully, abandoned. At all times the
spirit has been one of mutual interest and concern, and above
all, cooperation. Of course many of the proposals presented to
the Advisory Committee have brought forth opposing views, ei-
ther on a land use or institutional basis, but at all times a spirit
of compromise and cooperation has prevailed.
One more important activity should be briefly discussed.
Early on in the Recodification Project, the Commission initiated
a series of Roundtables, which have proven invaluable.2 3 These
Roundtables have been held in every part of the state, from
Nassau and Suffolk Counties in the east to Erie and Monroe
Counties in the west; from the Adirondacks in the north to
counties in the Southern Tier. 4 These Roundtables, to which
21. Id.
22. MARIO M. CUOMO, FOREST HILLS DIARY: THE CRISIS OF Low-INcoME HOUSING
(1974).
23. See, e.g., ROUNDTABLE MEETINGS, 1990, supra note 1, at i.
24. Id. at iii. For example, in 1990 meetings were held at Binghamton, Watertown,
Cooperstown, Hudson, Waterloo, Batavia, Lake George, White Plains, Huntington and
Lake Placid. Id.
19931
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county and local elected and appointed officials are invited,2" to-
gether with land use planners, surveyors and attorneys, re-
present an interesting (some say startling) innovation in state-
local relations. Rather than the usual approach of "the people
from the State are here to help you," Commission members and
staff, together with Advisory Committee members, attend these
meetings with the announced intention of listening to the
problems and opinions of the attendees, rather than talking at
the audience to tell what the State perceives as local problems
and how the State intends to solve these problems.
It has been found, quite logically, that this approach, inno-
vative though it may be, has given the Commission and the Ad-
visory Committee tremendous input at the local government
level as to exactly what land use and zoning problems exist, and
the difficulties encountered in using the state enabling legisla-
tion to address these problems. The writers' conclusion that the
state planning and zoning statutes are a mess becomes even
more frighteningly apparent when one sees just how [badly]
these statutes work at the local level or, more accurately, do not
work.26
II. The Mission of the Recodification Project
To narrow the mission of the Recodification Project, two
papers, one addressing the problems to be faced generally27 and
the second more specifically,28 were prepared by Commission
staff, and were presented at the very first Advisory Committee
meeting. These papers, meant to set the stage, outlined what the
Commission believed were the basic problems with the New
York planning and zoning statutes, in their language and their
effects. Both the analysis and approach in the papers remain
25. Id. app. at iii.
26. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
27. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON RURAL RESOURCES, STATE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON LAND USE STATUTES: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR REGIONAL LAND
USE ROUNDTABLES (material organized by Sheldon Damsky) (hereinafter BACKGROUND
INFORMATION).
28. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON RURAL RESOURCES, STATE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON LAND USE STATUTES, WORKING PAPER #3 - FUNCTIONS, POWERS AND
DUTIES OF THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS (1989) (material organized by Sheldon Dam-
sky) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER].
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pertinent. Therefore, parts II.A. and II.B. summarize these pa-
pers. As will be set forth later in this article, a number of the
problems initially presented have been solved by new legisla-
tion.2 9 Unfortunately, other problems remain.
A. General Problems to be Faced
In 1989, as now, zoning was so beset with problems, at all
levels of government, that it was difficult to know where to start
in listing them, much less in offering solutions.30 In the first pa-
per, the approach taken was to briefly discuss two major con-
cerns that permeate land use controls,31 then to go to more spe-
cific concerns that impact local zoning and planning practices.32
For proper perspective, two major problems must be discussed
first: (1) years of neglect of land use and planning concerns and
(2) the basic concept of zoning. Without a working resolution of
these fundamental problems, it may be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to address local issues.
1. Major Concerns
First, except for the effort that this Advisory Committee
and the Commission embarked upon, there had been absolutely
no attention given to planning and land use practices at the
state level for at least fifteen years prior to 1989.33 Neither the
executive nor legislative branches had even paid lip service to
the growing problems caused by a total absence of planning; nor
had they recognized the importance of coordinated land use,
health, environmental and transportation planning. 4 Even in a
strong home rule state,3 5 local governments cannot act in a vac-
29. See infra part IV.
30. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 1. See also State-wide opinion sur-
vey of stakeholders in New York land use system, conducted by McKinsey & Co., Inc. in
the first quarter of 1993, cited in Nolon, supra note 2, at 413 n.349.
31. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Under New York's Municipal Home Rule Law, local governments are authorized
to adopt and amend local laws relating to real property, provided that those laws are not
inconsistent with the state constitution or general state statutes. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE
LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1969). See generally Jill Devine, Note, Golden v. Planning
Board of Ramapo Revisited: Old Lessons for New Problems, 12 PACE L. REv. 107, 125-32
1993]
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uum like independent principalities, with no thought of the
overall effect of their actions on others, or of the effect of others'
actions on them.36
Second, as in 1989, it is absolutely essential that the basic
concept of zoning be reexamined. 7 There is a trend to place an
increasing number of problems at zoning's doorstep for solution,
when in actuality they perhaps should not be there at all. 8 Such
problems may, in fact, confuse or weaken traditional zoning.
For example, there is a great and ever-increasing need for
"affordable" housing: housing for the elderly, housing for those
seeking their start in life, housing for low and moderate income
families and singles, and housing for the homeless. 9 No one in
our society disputes these needs, but the overriding question
before us is - is it a function, or purpose, of zoning to meet
these needs? .Put another way, is zoning a mechanism whereby
various uses of land may be brought into harmony with one an-
other, or is it a social engineering mechanism whereby socio-eco-
nomic dilemmas are addressed?40
Another major problem is that in many instances modern
society and traditional zoning do not blend harmoniously.41 It is
axiomatic that if a land use cannot be, or is not adequately de-
(1992) (discussing New York's strong home rule tradition and contrasting it with the
state-wide land use schemes of other states, including Florida, Oregon, Hawaii and
Maine).
36. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 1.
37. Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of a town ordinance "establishing a comprehensive zoning plan
for regulating and restricting the location" of various classes of commercial and residen-
tial buildings). Traditional zoning, where land uses are kept in sharply segregated zones,
is called "Euclidean" zoning, after this case. For critiques of Euclidean Zoning, see gen-
erally ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP (Charles M. Haar &
Jerold S. Kayden, eds., 1989); DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CONTROL LAW 71 (1971); 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.17,
at 153 (3d ed. 1986); Jesse Dukeminier Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board of
Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273, 337 (1962).
38. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 1. See infra notes 39-47 and ac-
companying text.
39. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 1-2. See also John R. Nolon, Shat-
tering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of Local Government to Create
Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383, 384 (1989).
40. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 2.
41. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 2. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
[Vol. 13:559
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fined, it cannot be effectively regulated."2 In the past, this mat-
ter of definition did not, for the most part, present major
problems. Grocery stores sold foodstuffs; meat was purchased at
a butcher shop; medicines were bought at the drug store and
gasoline at a gas station. Today, however, this is not the case.
Now, it is not at all unusual to pull into a gas station/conve-
nience store and, while the oil is being checked, shop for grocer-
ies, aspirin, video tapes and flowers.'"
While we know that zoning may not be used to control com-
petition," how is a small town or village to react to a modern
shopping center on the outskirts of town, that fills all of our
needs, but at the same time drives long-established traditional
stores on the main street out of business and turns a thriving
downtown business district into a wasteland of empty stores and
"For Rent" signs?45
These (and of course there are more) examples illustrate the
need to address basic conceptual problems that are causing in-
creasing quandaries in land use planning and zoning regula-
tions.'6 There are of course many other concerns, both at the
state and local level, that are equally troublesome and equally
important. 7
2. State Land Use Statutes - a Need for Recodification
Simply stated, the New York land use statutes are a mess.
Since first adapted from the U.S. Department of Commerce
Model in the 1930's, they have never been comprehensively re-
viewed. 4' At most they have been added to in a patchwork fash-
42. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 2.
43. Id.
44. See Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals of North Hemp-
stead, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 415, 508 N.E.2d 130, 134, 515 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1987) (stating
that "zoning laws do not exist to insure limited business competition"). See also Hemp-
turn Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 197 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
45. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 2. See also Bartram v. Zoning
Comm'n of Bridgeport, 68 A.2d 308 (Conn. 1949) (discussing the impact on the down-
town area of providing an outlying shopping area).
46. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2-3. The Standard City Planning Enabling Act was proposed by the De-
partment of Commerce in 1928. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928).
1993]
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ion, resulting in a lack of cohesion and in many instances limited
utility.4
For example, the land use statutes have never contained a
definition section.5 0 Nor have discrete sections defined terms
used therein. Words and phrases that are key components to
land use are not defined, and in many instances are not even
mentioned. Variances, special permits, nonconforming uses,
planned unit development, and a host of other important zoning
tools and mechanisms are nowhere mentioned, much less de-
fined, in state statutes. 1
Other important concepts are mentioned, but in such a
fashion as to obfuscate, not clarify. For example, state statutes
contain two fundamental planning and zoning precepts, the
"comprehensive plan ' 52 and the "master plan."5 " The first pre-
cept, the comprehensive plan, is treated as a nebulous concept in
the statutes, with the shibboleth that zoning must be "in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan" 5" as its sole reference. Practi-
tioners and local officials are left with nothing but case law to
determine just what a comprehensive plan or master plan is. 55
The courts early on initiated the confusion by finding that
"[i]t is easier to determine what a 'comprehensive plan' is not,
than to define what it is:"565 Following this somewhat less than
definitive, initial clarification, the court continued:
[I]t is not necessarily a 'master plan' such as may be drafted by a
municipality before embarking on a program of capital improve-
ments; ... nor need it be a written plan. The comprehensive plan
49. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955).
53. Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955). "[Master plan] is the term most frequently employed. 'Com-
prehensive plan,' 'general plan,' 'municipal plan,' 'city plan,' 'long range plan,' or just
plain 'plan' are also used. But the differing nomenclature appears to have no functional
significance." Id. at 354 n.4.
54. Udell v. Hass, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 468, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893
(1968) (quoting the phrase from the former § 177 of the Village Law of 1909, now N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
55. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
56. Place v. Hack, 34 Misc. 2d 777, 780, 230 N.Y.S.2d 583, 587 (Sup. Ct. Wayne
County 1962).
[Vol. 13:559
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in New York and most jurisdictions is neither a written document
nor a 'plan' in the usual sense of that term, unless an underlying
purpose to control land use for the benefit of the whole commu-
nity may be regarded as such. 7
In Udell v. Haas,5 the Court of Appeals emphasized the
importance of the comprehensive plan without any attempt to
further clarify the nature or character of exactly what the in-
creasingly mythical beast actually is:
[I]n exercising their zoning powers, the local authorities must act
for the benefit of the community as a whole following a calm and
deliberate consideration of the alternatives, and not because of
the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of the
community. (DeSena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239
(2d Dep't 1965)). Thus, the mandate of the Village Law (Sec. 177)
is not a mere technicality which serves only as an obstacle course
for public officials to overcome in carrying out their duties.
Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without
it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insur-
ance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does
not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.5 9
More recently, many cases have expanded upon the concept
of the comprehensive plan, still without reaching any definition.
In Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco,60 the Court of
Appeals opined that "[t]he obligation is support of comprehen-
sive planning, not slavish servitude to any particular comprehen-
sive plan." 1
Finally, another leading case added another important ele-
ment to the concept or, if you prefer, to the puzzle. In Berenson
v. Town of New Castle,62 which is also a leading case in the field
of exclusionary zoning, the court expanded the comprehensive
plan requirement by adding a two-pronged test. First, the plan-
ning board must have provided an appropriate development
57. Id. at 780, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (citations omitted) (quoting David A. Yaffe &
Herbert N. Cohen, Note, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 303, 304, 305 (1959)).
58. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
59. Id. at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
60. 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973).
61. Id. at 188, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
62. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
1993]
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plan, tailored to the characteristics of its community."s Second,
the plan must consider regional housing needs:
There must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the sta-
tus quo within the community and the greater public interest
that regional needs be met. Although we are aware of the tradi-
tional view that zoning acts only upon the property lying within
the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recognized that
zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of
the municipality. Thus, the court in examining an ordinance,
should take into consideration not only the general welfare of the
residents of the zoning township, but should also consider the ef-
fect of the ordinance on the neighboring communities.
6 4
In Berenson, the Court of Appeals added two more undefined
elements, "regional" and "needs" 65 to an already thoroughly un-
defined term, the "comprehensive plan," which cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered as clarification.
. Although it should be obvious at this point that the last
thing needed is further confusion, that is unfortunately what is
needed to prove the point. State statutes contain not only the
comprehensive plan requirement, 6 but also that of the master
plan. 6  We have seen that the comprehensive plan is at best a
nebulous concept, since it need not be a written document nor
63. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
64. Id. at 110-11, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
65. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
66. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (Mc-
Kinney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney Supp. 1993). A comprehensive plan
is defined as:
the materials, written and/or graphic, including, but not limited to maps,
charts, studies, resolutions, reports and other descriptive material as may be ap-
propriate, that identify the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, stan-
dards, devices and instruments for the immediate and long-range protection, en-
hancement, growth and development of the [city, town or village] and which,
among other things, serve as a basis for functional plans, land use regulation, in-
frastructure development, public and private investment.
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(3)(b); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(3)(b).
67. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 272-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-722 (McKinney 1973 &
Supp. 1993). The parallel language in each statute reads, "[tihe planning board may
prepare and change, a comprehensive master plan for the development of the entire area
of the [city, town, village] . N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a; N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a;
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-722.
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be adopted with any procedural formality. The statutory refer-
ences to the "comprehensive master plan" may be more concrete
as to what it should contain (primarily capital projects), but
there is no indication, either in statute or judicial decision, as to
its exact purpose, its relation, if any, to the comprehensive plan,
or its legal force and effect. The writers freely admit that in fifty
years (combined, we hasten to add) of dealing almost exclusively
with planning and zoning issues, they have absolutely no idea of
what a master plan is.
3. The Courts: Legislating In A Vacuum
Increasingly, the lack of clarity in state statutes has re-
quired the courts to actually legislate land use law. 8 While the
courts have on several occasions eschewed the role of a legisla-
tive body or a planning agency, 9 statutory interpretation has led
to this result, in many instances with less than happy conse-
quences.7 This is not to cast blame on the courts, which are left
little choice in the face of legislative reluctance to address land
use statutes and issues over the years.
An example of this lack of clarity is the role of the courts,
and indeed of zoning itself, in what may be social rather than
land use issues71 "The plight of the disadvantaged, the homeless
and those in desperate need of affordable housing is more and
more being heard in the courts as a land use issue. ' 72 Public in-
volvement is growing and becoming increasingly militant.7 3 Slow
growth and no growth advocates, neighborhood groups, environ-
mental activists and others are heard from these days as much
as those who hold public office .7 Acronyms such as NIMBY (not
in my back yard) and LULU (locally unwanted land use) are
becoming rallying cries for many formerly diverse interests."
The lack of attention to these modern problems and a failure to
68. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 3.
69. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 332, 491
N.Y.S.2d 396, 402 (2d Dep't 1985).
70. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 3-4.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
1993]
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recognize the need for regional approaches to local land use is-
sues can only result in forcing the courts to become what they
least want to become, and are least suited for - super-legisla-
tive bodies.78
Further, in reviewing the land use statutes, one must bear
in mind that these statutory provisions are administered primar-
ily by lay persons. 7 Local planning boards and zoning boards of
appeals, particularly in rural areas, do not have access (or
means) to attorneys knowledgeable in land use law.78 It is at this
point then - the local government level - that all of the
problems we have discussed, and others, come into play.79
4. Local Land Use Administration
It is at the local level that the tensions created by changing
times and changing concepts are focused in land use planning
and zoning practices."' The many forces at work in our modern
society seem at times to be in conflict with one another. 1 These
problems are being addressed at the local level with increasing
difficulty.82
As late as 1974, the United States Supreme Court, in Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas,88 noted that "[a] quiet place where
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are le-
gitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs." 84 There are obviously many municipalities that whole-
heartedly agree with this language (to say nothing of the senti-
ment) and wish only to maintain their rural character, appear-
ance and traditions, even if within a major urban conurbation.88
Still, communities are faced not only with increasing develop-
ment pressures, but with court decisions requiring that regional
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
84. Id. at 9; see also BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 4.
85. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
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needs be taken into account in comprehensive plans," and
others in which courts denounce exclusionary zoning.8
7
Increasingly, local governments, faced with land use plan-
ning concepts and purposes that are seemingly in conflict, are
not using land use controls to look to the future, but rather as
defensive measures. 8 Ad hoc zoning amendments,8 9 moratoria,"°
and the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) 9' are
used to stop development for which the community is ill pre-
pared or just does not want, rather than to accommodate it.92
Exacerbating this problem is the fact that many local offi-
cials, both elected and appointed, who administer zoning have
little, if any, training or education in the subject.93 In addition,
the constant turnover in office impedes the building up of any
reservoir of knowledge and experience over a period of time.9"
Thus, the increasing volume of case law, its complexity, and the
86. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110-11, 341 N.E.2d
236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975); BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
87. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285 N.E.2d
291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149 (1972); BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
88. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
89. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 473-74, 235 N.E.2d 897, 903, 288
N.Y.S.2d 888, 897 (1968) (village attempted to rezone the plaintiff's property from busi-
ness to residential after the plaintiff submitted plans to build a bowling alley and a store
on the property).
90. See, e.g., Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 256, 167
N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957) (holding that a town's morato-
rium on building permits, with no set end, was void because the enabling statute did not
authorize "a direct regulation of the rate of growth"); see also Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 382,
285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155 (upholding development in accordance with
master plan and capital budget that could effectively postpone the granting of particular
building permits for as long as eighteen years); Noghrey v. Acampora, 152 A.D.2d 660,
660, 543 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding that an enabling statute may permit
moratoria while a comprehensive plan is being adopted); Lisa F. Foderaro, Ban on Sewer
Connections Unnerves Builders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1989, at B6 (moratorium on new
sewer mains).
91. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993).
92. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. The possible eighteen-year sus-
pension of development in Ramapo was upheld by the Court of Appeals because it saw
the town's plan as a mechanism for accommodating growth, rather than excluding it.
"They seek, not to freeze population at present levels but to maximize growth by the
efficient use of land, and in so doing testify to this community's continuing role in popu-
lation assimilation." Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152-53 (1972).
93. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
94. Id.
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lack of experienced officials and knowledgeable attorneys to as-
sist them, makes it almost impossible for local officials to deal
with the pressures of development. 5
An excellent example of this conclusion is the unemploy-
ment insurance case In re Field Delivery Serv., Inc.e6 Field es-
tablished the rule that "[a] decision of an administrative agency
which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates
its reason for reaching a different result on essentially the same
facts is arbitrary and capricious. ''7 This ruling was made appli-
cable to planning and zoning boards of appeals in 1986 in
Knight v. Amelkin,9 e but by way of such an obscure reference
that many local officials and attorneys were not (and many still
are not) aware of its holding. This is to say nothing of the sub-
stantial departure the holding made from well-established law
that each case is to be decided on its own facts. 9
B. Concrete Goals
The first paper presented to the then newly-formed Advi-
sory Committee dealt with major changes in the area of planning
and land use law.100 The second paper, which continued to deal
with the problems facing any recodification effort, built on the
first and addressed the goals of the Commission and the Advi-
sory Committee in more concrete terms.10' This paper focused
on more cosmetic and substantive changes, rather than on com-
prehensive planning. Among other concerns, the second paper
addressed the lack of definitions for important terms and con-
cepts inherent in the practice of land use control, particularly
the term "variance". 10
The local government enabling statutes have long provided
95. Id.
96. 66 N.Y.2d 516, 488 N.E.2d 1223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1985).
97. Id. at 516-17, 488 N.E.2d .at 1226, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
98. 68 N.Y.2d 975, 977, 503 N.E.2d 106, 106, 510 N.Y.S.2d 550, 550 (1986).
99. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 27, at 5.
100. Id.
101. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 28.
102. Id. at 1 (focusing on the power of zoning boards of appeal in granting variances
per Town Law § 267). "A variance is an authorization for the construction or mainte-
nance of a building or structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of
land, which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance." 3 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING § 20.02, at 365 (3d ed. 1986).
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that zoning boards of appeals may grant variances. 03 Variances
from zoning regulations could be granted if there were "practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardship," without any distinction be-
tween the type of variance involved. ' In the landmark case of
Otto v. Steinhilber,'0 5 the Court of Appeals held that the term
"unnecessary hardship"'10 6 applied only to variances in the use of
premises." 7 The court enunciated three elements of proof, all of
which had to be found to justify the grant of a variance on the
ground of unnecessary hardship.' The most significant of these
elements, and quite possibly the hardest for the applicant to
show, is that the property "cannot yield a reasonable return if
used only for a purpose allowed in that zone."'' 09 Other Court of
103. The language of N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b, in 1939 provided:
Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of carry-
ing out the strict letter of such ordinance, the board of appeals shall have the
power in passing upon appeals, to vary or modify the application of any of the
regulations or provisions of such ordinance relating to the use, construction or
alteration of the buildings or structures, or the use of land, so that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured and substantial jus-
tice done.
See Act of May 21, 1923, ch. 564, sec. 1, § 179-b, 1923 N.Y. Laws 855, 858, quoted in
Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 75-76, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852-53 (1939). It should be noted
that the word "variance" was not used in the statute. Instead, the language relied on was
"vary or modify."
104. See Act of May 21, 1923, ch. 564, sec. 1, § 179-b, 1923 N.Y. Laws 855, 858;
supra note 103.
105. 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939).
106. Id. at 75, 24 N.E.2d at 852. "In order to prevent the oppressive operation of the
zoning law in particular instances, when the zoning restrictions are otherwise generally
reasonable, the zoning laws usually create a safety valve under the control of a Board of
Appeals, which may relieve against 'unnecessary hardship' in particular instances." Id.
107. The term "use variance" was not used in Otto. In a later case that was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division explained that the 'unnecessary hard-
ship' "language in the Otto opinion is intended to apply to a variance in the use of
premises and not to a variance in the area upon which a building may be constructed."
Village of Bronxville v. Francis, 1 A.D.2d 236, 238, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908-09 (2d Dep't),
aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 839, 135 N.E.2d 724, 153 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1956).
108. Otto, 282 N.Y. at 76, 24 N.E.2d at 853. The court explained:
to grant a variance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship, the record must
show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for
a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may
reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to
be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the locality.
Id.
109. Id.
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Appeals cases held that a self-created hardship was a more sig-
nificant -r determinh.g factor in thc decision to grant or not to
grant a use variance. 110
In Village of Bronxville v. Francis,"' the court held that an
area variance should be granted upon a mere showing of "practi-
cal difficulties." 1 '2 Three years later, the case of Wachsberger v.
Michalis"3 set forth guidelines to be used in determining
whether an area variance should be granted.1"" These guidelines
were followed by later cases'1 5 and placed into the text of virtu-
ally every municipal zoning law in New York. Unlike the use
variance tests, all of which had to be met, the Wachsberger rules
were guidelines for zoning boards of appeals to follow in balanc-
ing the individual difficulty to be avoided against the public
good. 1 6
110. See DeSena v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 105, 108, 379
N.E.2d 1144, 1145, 408 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1978) (self-created nature of difficulty is less
significant in consideration of an area variance than of a use variance); Hoffman v. Har-
ris, 17 N.Y.2d 138, 145, 216 N.E.2d 326, 330, 269 N.Y.S.2d 119, 124 (1966) (purchase of
property with notice of a self-imposed hardship bars granting of a use variance, but not
of an area variance); Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead, 301 N.Y. 86, 89, 92
N.E.2d 903, 903 ("one who thus knowingly acquires land for a prohibited use, cannot
thereafter have a variance on the ground of 'special hardship' "), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
933 (1950).
111. 1 A.D.2d 236, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 839, 135 N.E.2d 724,
153 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1956).
112. Id. at 238, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
113. 19 Misc. 2d 909, 912, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621, 624 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959),
aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 921, 238 N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't 1963).
114. Id. at 912, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 624. The court explained:
[i]n its determination [of whether an area variance should be granted] the board
should consider (1) how substantial the variation is in relation to the requirement;
(2) the effect, if the variance is allowed, of the increased population density thus
produced on available governmental facilities (fire, water, garbage and the like);
(3) whether a substantial change will be produced in the character of the neigh-
borhood or a substantial detriment to adjoining properties created; (4) whether
the difficulty can be obviated by some method, feasible for the applicant to pur-
sue, other than a variance; and (5) whether in view of the manner in which the
difficulty arose and considering all of the above factors the interests of justice will
be served by allowing the variance.
Id.
115. See, e.g., Children's Hosp. of Buffalo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Buffalo, 181
A.D.2d 1056, 1057-58, 582 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (4th Dep't 1992); Franchise Realty Inter-
state Corp. v. Pisaturo, 75 A.D.2d 1003, 1004, 429 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (4th Dep't 1980);
Cohalan v. Schermerhorn, 77 Misc. 2d 23, 28, 351 N.Y.S.2d 505, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
116. See Children's Hosp., 181 A.D.2d at 1058, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 318 ("Once the ap-
plicant demonstrates practical difficulties, the municipality must prove that relevant
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/10
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Then in the 1967 case, Fulling v. Palumbo,'1 7 the Court of
Appeals introduced the "significant economic injury" rule for
area variances.'18 In effect, it said that where a property owner
would suffer such injury, an area variance would be granted un-
less the municipality met its burden of showing that the public
health, safety and welfare would be served by upholding the ap-
plication of the regulation.'19 Fulling threw the hitherto rela-
tively easy law of area variances into hopeless confusion. 20 It
was impossible to determine if the Fulling doctrine replaced
"practical difficulties," was "practical difficulties," or ran side-
by-side with "practical difficulties."' 1 To add to this confusion,
some sixty years after the term "practical difficulties" was intro-
duced in state statute, cases such as Human Dev. Servs. of Port
Chester v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Port Chester,22 observed
that "[t]he contours of the term 'practical difficulties' have yet
to be definitively identified."'12 3 However, these contours were
addressed by the Court of Appeals in Doyle v. Amster,2 ' where
the court explained that "practical difficulty" could generally be
established by proof that a property owner cannot utilize the
property without violating existing zoning restrictions.'25 Al-
though Fulling has been effectively overruled by this decision,'
the Doyle court expressly recognized that "practical difficulty"
was not subject to precise definition. 12 7
public health, safety and welfare concerns outweigh the applicant's difficulties and re-
quire strict adherence to the applicable zoning standard.").
117. 21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967), overruled in part by
Doyle v. Amster, 79 N.Y.2d 592, 594 N.E.2d 911, 584 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1992).
118. Id. at 33, 233 N.E.2d at 274, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
119. Id.
120. See National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 442, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 1032,
393 N.YS.2d 379, 383 (1977) (holding that the manner in which the financial hardship
arises is a relevant factor which may be considered by the board in granting an area
variance); Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591, 598, 363 N.E.2d 305, 309, 394 N.Y.S.2d 579,
583 (1977) (citing National Merritt with approval).
121. See supra text accompanying note 112.
122. 110 A.D.2d 135, 493 N.Y.S.2d 481 (2d Dep't 1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 702, 490
N.E.2d 846, 499 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1986).
123. Id. at 139, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (quoting Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 382
N.E.2d 756, 757, 410 N.Y.S.2d 56, 57 (1978)).
124. 79 N.Y.2d 592, 594 N.E.2d 911, 584 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1992).
125. Id. at 595-96, 594 N.E.2d at 913-14, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 419-20.
126. Id. at 596, 594 N.E.2d at 914, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
127. Id. at 595, 594 N.E.2d at 913, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
1993]
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III. Goals of the Project
A project whose goal is the recodification and updating of
land use laws must, of necessity, set a number of different goals
and pursue a number of different approaches. This is because a
number of statutes are presently adequate for their purposes,
but need cosmetic changes to increase their utility; others re-
quire changes that, while more than cosmetic, are actually clari-
fying or simplifying amendments and not really substantive.
Still other statutes require major overhauls so that they can be
understood and applied by local officials, reflect current plan-
ning objectives, and be in keeping with current judicial interpre-
tation. Finally, there are major issues in the area of planning
and land use law that are at the very foundation of our statutes
and practice that have never been addressed in state statutes.
A. Cosmetic Changes
Examples of cosmetic changes would be those statutes deal-
ing with the procedure for the adoption of zoning regulations
and the approval of subdivision plats.128 Problems with these
statutes consist largely of long, run-on sentences in seemingly
endless paragraphs. A simple rearrangement of these provisions
would make them easier to follow, and, therefore, easier to ap-
ply. The changes in Town Law section 265129 that were adopted
in 1990, illustrate this process. 130
128. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 264, 276-278 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.Y. VIL-
LAGE LAW §§ 7-706, 7-728, 7-730 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
129. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
130. The pre-1990 language was:
Such regulations, restrictions and boundaries may from time to time be amended,
supplemented, changed, modified or repealed by ordinance. In case, however, of a
protest against such change signed by the owners of twenty per centum or more,
either of the area of the land included in such proposed change, or of that imme-
diately adjacent extending one hundred feet therefrom or of that directly opposite
thereto, extending one hundred feet from the streetfrontage of such opposite land,
such amendment shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of at
least three-fourths of the members of the town board.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265 (McKinney 1987). The comparable language in
the present legislation reads:
1. Such regulations, restrictions and boundaries may from time to time be
amended. Such amendment shall be effected by a simple majority vote of the town
board, except that any such amendment shall require the approval of at least
three-fourths of the members of the town board in the event such amendment is
[Vol. 13:559
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Some of the changes in section 265 of the Town Law (sec-
tion 7-708 of the Village Law) also exemplify changes of the sec-
ond type, those that are more than cosmetic,'but less than sub-
stantive. 3 ' There is no quarrel with the statutory concept that
protests received from a certain percentage of property owners
within a certain distance of the affected property require an ex-
traordinary vote of the legislative body before final passage. 132
The difficulty, however, is that the lack of clarity with respect to
exactly who may bring such protest and how the distance from
the affected property is actually measured has resulted in confu-
sion since the statute has been on the books.1 3 A simple amend-
ment clarifying these points would not change the thrust of the
statute, but would make it more comprehensible and easier to
apply.
B. Substantive Changes
The third group contains those statutes that require sub-
stantive change, either to reflect modern development in the ar-
eas covered, or because subsequent judicial and administrative
interpretation has shrouded the original or amended statutory
provisions in doubt and confusion. For example, while the rules
governing the granting of use variances have been consistent
since 1939 when they were first established in Otto v.
the subject of a written protest, presented to the town board and signed by:
(a) the owners of twenty percent or more of the area of land included in such
proposed change; or
(b) the owners of twenty percent or more of the area of land immediately adjacent
to that land included in such proposed change, extending one hundred feet there-
from; or
(c) the owners of twenty percent or more of the area of land directly opposite
thereto, extending one hundred feet from the street frontage of such opposite
land.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(1)(a)-(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (enacted by Act of July 18,1990,
ch. 606, sec. 1, 1990 N.Y. Laws 1279, 1279-80.
131. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265. Parallel language is found in N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-708
(McKinney Supp. 1993).
132. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(1)(a)-(c). See generally Eleanor Steinholtz, Comment,
Procedural Requirements for Elactment, Amendment and Repeal of Zoning Ordi-
nances in New York State, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 60, 67-69 (1963).
133. See Steinholtz, supra note 132, at 67-69; see also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(1)(a)-
1993]
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Steinhilber,134 the exact opposite is true with respect to area
variances.135 From the relatively simple suggestions set forth for
zoning boards of appeals to follow in Wachsberger v. Michalis,36
this body of law has progressed through Doyle v. Amster,1 37 to
total confusion, with no scholar, lawyer, or local official comfort-
ably sure of the rules governing these variances. Thus, the ques-
tion is whether the requirements for the granting of area vari-
ances, as well as other problem areas, should be clarified by
legislation. 138
C. Major Changes
Finally, we have the remaining category of what may be
termed major legislation: those concepts and issues that reflect
modern problems and concerns, and are nowhere (or are inade-
quately) addressed by existing statutes. Among these would be
affordable housing, open space, agricultural lands, impact fees,
locally unwanted uses, authority of various levels of government
and a host of others.
IV. Statutory Reform Efforts
It is hoped that the above will serve as both background
and prologue to the actual efforts of the Commission, Commis-
sion Staff, the Advisory Committee and the participants at the
various Roundtables. It is at this point that we can turn to the
efforts aimed at actually recodifying the planning and zoning en-
134. 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939); see Foland v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Bethlehem, 26 Misc. 2d 1093, 1094, 207 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (holding that
because a use variance allows property to be used in a way that conflicts with the zoning
ordinance, the power to grant use variances should be exercised rarely and requires a
showing of unnecessary hardship); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 43 N.Y.2d 598,
607, 374 N.E.2d 105, 109, 403 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1978) (affirming the standard of Otto
for use variances, but modifying it when dealing with the specific needs of a public
utility).
135. See National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 442-44, 361 N.E.2d 1028,
393 N.Y.S.2d 379, 382-84 (1977).
136. 19 Misc. 2d 909, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afJ'd, 18 A.D.2d 921, 238
N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't 1963). See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
137. 79 N.Y.2d 592, 594 N.E.2d 911, 584 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1992).
138. The requirements for the granting of an area variance were clarified by Act of
June 30, 1992, ch. 248, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927. See infra notes 178-97 and accompanying
text.
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abling statutes. Obviously (and some times unfortunately) the
only way to measure these efforts is not by good intentions or
amount of effort, but rather by success in having proposals en-
acted into law.
A. 1990
The first year of the Recodification Project was spent in or-
ganizing the effort, defining its goals and determining the best
way to achieve these goals. As a result, very few ideas or propos-
als were actually translated into proposed bills. Out of these few
that did become bills, none were enacted into law. This was not
due to a lack of effort to advance these proposals. Rather, it was
probably due to the newness of the Recodification Project and
the fact that legislators and legislative staff had not recognized
that a serious recodification effort was underway. Also, the Com-
mission faced the historic reluctance of the State Legislature to
address land use issues."3 9 Whatever the reason, of the few bills
offered in 1990, none were passed.
B.. 1991
The next year, 1991, was happily, a different story. The
work of the Advisory Committee, appearances by Commission
staff before Senate and Assembly standing committees to which
various bills were assigned, and the establishment of an effective
liaison between the Commission and Senate and Assembly pro-
gram staff, provided a more effective forum and resulted in fre-
quent meetings to discuss the reasoning behind and the merits
of new proposals.
In 1991 four Commission bills achieved passage by both
houses and were signed into law by Governor Cuomo.1'0 At this
juncture two points must be made. First, almost without excep-
tion, Commission bills carry a one year delay in their effective
dates. The reason for this delay is to prevent local governments
from being caught by surprise by new legislation. Another pur-
139. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
140. Act of June 21, 1991, ch. 185, 1991 N.Y. Laws 456 (S. 3423, A. 5472); Act of
July 26, 1991, ch. 629, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1231 (S. 3589-A, A. 5984-A); Act of July 26, 1991,
ch. 657, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318 (A. 5985-B); Act of Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, 1991 N.Y. Laws
1364 (S. 3526-A, A. 5858-A).
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pose is to give groups such as the Planning Federation, the Con-
ference of Mayors, the Association of Towns, and agencies such
as the Department of State and the Department of Environmen-
tal Conservation, all of which conduct local government training
programs, to include in their conferences and seminars discus-
sions of any new land use legislation before it becomes effective.
Second, the following discussion of the bills will make no effort
to attach particular importance to any piece of legislation as
compared to any other. The grouping or discussion should not
be considered by the reader to carry any implication that one
bill is more important than any other.
As stated, the 1991 legislative session saw the passage and
signing into law of four bills. 41 It can be seen that this in itself
was of tremendous importance to the Commission and the
Recodification Project itself. It showed, in addition to the intrin-
sic importance of any particular bill, that the State Legislature,
program staff and committee staff had been made aware that a
genuine recodification effort was underway and that recognition
of the Project should be afforded at their levels. This was con-
sidered as important an accomplishment as was the success of
any particular piece of legislation.
The first bill for discussion provided that members of mu-
nicipal boards, bureaus or commissions (including but not lim-
ited to legislative bodies), planning boards, or zoning boards of
appeals, may serve as members of county or regional planning
boards.1 42 This bill was believed necessary because an Opinion of
the Attorney General1 43 had decided that such dual membership
created a "direct and substantial conflict of interest."" This
Opinion, and one which modified it somewhat,1 45 caused great
consternation among members of local and county planning
boards, whose reasoning was that local board members who also
served on county boards would be peculiarly possessed of the
necessary knowledge of local problems to enhance their efforts
at the county or regional level. Zoning consultants, planners and
141. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
142. Act of June 21, 1991, ch. 185, 1991 N.Y. Laws 456 (codified as amended at N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW §239-b (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
143. 89-36 Op. Att'y Gen. 112 (1989).
144. Id. at 113.
145. 90-56 Op. Att'y Gen. 1099 (1990).
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land use attorneys in both the public and private sector were
flooded with phone calls and letters asking that something be
done to allow such dual membership. Chapter 185 (which be-
cause of its importance and the fact that it was easy to under-
stand, carried an immediate effective date) provided that
solution.
Another measure adopted in 1991 related to the procedural
requirements necessary for the adoption of town and village zon-
ing regulations." ' As is the case with many land use statutes
which were amended or replaced in the Recodification Project,
section 264 of the Town Law and section 7-706 of the Village
Law, both relating to procedure, were first rearranged and re-
paragraphed in a more logical manner to make them easier to
use and understand. 1 7 Many of these statutes can be improved
by merely doing away with the legislative penchant for placing
endless sentences in interminable paragraphs. We have often re-
marked (to the general agreement of the audience) that the first
radical innovation of the Commission staff was to introduce
paragraphs and punctuation to existing statutes, which might
well be as helpful as innovative substantive amendments.
In any event, few major substantive changes were made to
the procedural statutes. 14 8 However, some of these substantive
changes deserve mention. First, as was done with each bill pre-
pared by the Commission staff, reference has been made to the
necessity of conformance of local actions to the mandates of sec-
tion 239-m of the General Municipal Law (county referral of cer-
tain local actions)'49 and compliance with SEQRA. 50 This does
146. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 657, sec. 1-3, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1318-20 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 133, 264, 265), sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1320-21
(codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-706).
147. Id. sec. 2, 1991 N.Y Laws 1318, 1318-19 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 264), sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1320-21 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-706). See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
148. See Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 657, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318.
149. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §239-m (McKinney 1984). See, e.g., Act of July 26, 1991,
ch. 657, sec. 2, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1319 (amending Town Law § 264 to include compli-
ance with Gen. Mun. Law § 239-m), sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1320 (amending Village
Law § 7-706 to include compliance with Gen. Mun. Law § 239-m).
150. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993).
See, e.g., Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 657, sec. 2, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1319 (amending
Town Law § 264 to include compliance with SEQRA), sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318,
1320-21 (amending Village Law § 7-706 to include compliance with SEQRA).
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not represent a substantive statutory change, but rather serves
as an often needed reminder to local officials and municipal
attorneys.
One important substantive change allows the publication of
a summary or abstract of any town or village zoning amend-
ments, rather than the full text, which has always been a finan-
cial burden to local governments.151 While case law has held this
to be permissible if authorized by local law,152 this change repre-
sents the first time that a statute makes such provision. In addi-
tion, the amendment provides that, for towns, an ordinance shall
take effect upon its filing in the office of the town clerk, rather
than a certain number of days after publication.15 For villages,
the local law shall take effect upon its filing with the Secretary
of State.'
In addition to these two measures, two Commission propos-
als of major importance were signed into law in 1991.165 The first
dealt with a subject that had rarely been mentioned in case law
and never in state statute - incentive zoning.156 The only refer-
ence in case law to incentive (or bonus) zoning of which the au-
thors are aware appears in Asian Americans For Equality v.
Koch,'57 a case which involved the comprehensive plan and ex-
clusionary zoning. In any event, the court saw fit not only to
discuss the mechanism, but to define it:
Incentive zoning is based on the premise that certain uneconomic
uses and amenities will not be provided by private development
without economic incentive. The economic incentive frequently
used . . . is the allowance of greater density within a proposed
151. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 657, sec. 3, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1319-20 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(2)), sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1321 (codified as
amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-706(5)).
152. See Town of Clifton Park v. C.P. Enters., 45 A.D.2d 96, 97, 356 N.Y.S.2d 122,
124 (3d Dep't 1974).
153. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 657, sec. 3, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1319-20 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265(2)).
154. Id. sec. 4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1318, 1321 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-706(7)).
155. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 629, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1231 (S. 3589-A, A. 5984-A); Act
of Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364 (S. 3526-A, A. 5858-A). See supra note 140.
156. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 629, sec. 1, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1231, 1232 (codified at N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-703 (McKinney Supp. 1993)), sec. 2, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1231, 1232-34
(codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
157. 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527 N.E.2d 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988).
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building, more floor area than permitted under general zoning
rules, if developers provided certain amenities for the community.
The amendment awards bonus points which entitle developers to
expand their construction in return for increased construction of
other, uneconomic projects such as low-cost housing, slum reha-
bilitation or public facilities. ' 58
Simply stated, this form of zoning, which has been used
mostly in large cities in New York, allows the municipality to
offer a developer an additional number of floors, greater floor
area, a larger number of units, etc., in a building or develop-
ment, over that allowed by the applicable zoning regulations. In
exchange, the developer agrees to construct, for example, a thea-
ter, atrium or vest pocket park. In New Jersey the device is fre-
quently used to permit a developer to exceed the zoning restric-
tions in apartment complexes, on the condition that a certain
percentage of the dwelling units are made available to those of
low or moderate income. '9
The new legislation amends both the Town Law by adding a
new Section 261-b,160 and the Village Law, by adding a new Sec-
tion 7-703.161 These sections define incentive zoning and estab-
lish a process for its authorization and implementation.16 2 Al-
though not a part of the 1991 legislation, incentive zoning was
authorized for cities by chapter 247 of the Laws of 1992, which
became effective immediately. 163
Finally, as far as 1991 is concerned, one other measure
achieved passage,"' which in our opinion, represents the most
158. Id. at 129, 527 N.E.2d at 269, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
159. See Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456
A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel I).
160. Act of July 26, 1991, ch. 629, sec. 2, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1232, 1232-34 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b).
161. Id. sec. 1, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1231, 1232 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW 7-703).
162. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-703. Both sections are entitled
"Incentive zoning; definitions, purpose, conditions, procedures." These sections allow a
town or village board to provide for a system of zoning incentives or bonuses to advance
the town or village's comprehensive plan and any other community planning mechanism
or land use technique. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b(2); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-703(2).
163. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 247, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 925, 925-27 (codified at
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-b (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
164. Act of Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364 (S. 3526-A, A. 5858-A). See
supra note 140.
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sweeping statutory change since the original planning and zon-
ing laws were put on the books. Chapter 692 of the Laws of 1991
(effective July 1, 1992) repealed Town Law section 267, and Vil-
lage Law section 7-712, which pertained to the functions, powers
and duties of zoning boards of appeals, and replaced them with
new sections. 6 ' Although this is not a strict mathematical com-
putation, the most cursory look at the annotations in the statute
books reveals that most of the planning and zoning litigation in-
volves zoning boards of appeals, and this litigation primarily in-
volves variances."0 6 If there were indeed any statutes that cried
out for overhaul and clarification, these were such statutes.
167
Against this brief background, the most important changes
in the new statutes concern variances. New Town Law, section
267-b(2) 6 s and Village Law, section 7-712-b(2) 169 codify the New
York case law, starting with Otto, to establish criteria for the
granting of use variances. 170 The codification enunciates the
rules the courts have developed over the last fifty years.1 7' An
applicant for a use variance must demonstrate "unnecessary
hardship" to the zoning board of appeals. 172 Unnecessary hard-
ship requires a showing that all of the following have been met:
1.Under the applicable zoning regulations, the applicant is de-
prived of all economic use or benefit from the property.173
165. Town Law § 267 was repealed and replaced by adding a new § 267. See Act of
Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, sec. 1, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364, 1364-65 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 267 (McKinney Supp. 1993)). Additionally, chapter 692 added new Town Law sections
267-a, 267-b and 267-c. See Act of Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, sec. 2-4, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364,
1365-68 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 267-a, 267-b and 267-c (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
Village Law § 7-712 was repealed and replaced by adding a new § 7-712. See Act of Aug.
2, 1991, ch. 692, sec. 5, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364, 1368-69 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
712 (McKinney Supp. 1993)). Chapter 692 also added new Village Law sections 7-712-a,
7-712-b and 7-712-c. See Act of Aug. 2, 1991, ch. 692, sec. 6-8, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364,
1368-72 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-712-a, 7-712-b, 7-712-c (McKinney Supp.
1993)).
166. Actually, the word "variance" never appeared in the statutes. The language
used was "vary or modify." See supra note 103.
167. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 28, at 1.
168. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2).
169. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2).
170. James A. Coon & Sheldon W. Damsky, Revisions to State Zoning Laws En-
acted, 5 MUN. LAW. 1, 1 (1991).
171. See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text.
172. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b).
173. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)(1); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b)(1).
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2.The hardship is unique, and does not apply to a substantial
portion of the district or neighborhood. 174
3.The variance will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood. 17 8
4. The hardship is not self-created.17 1
The rules for issuing use variances are more clearly estab-
lished by the courts than the rules for the issuance of area vari-
ances. 177 This is an understatement of epic proportions. A new
statutory process for the granting of area variances has been es-
tablished by new Town Law section 267-b(3) 178 and new Village
Law section 7-712-(b)(3). 9 While there is no "test" as such for
the granting of area variances, the new laws require that the
board of appeals balance the benefit the applicant would receive
from the variance, against the detriment to the health, safety
and welfare of the community or neighborhood that would occur
if the variance were granted. 80 In addition to jettisoning the
"practical difficulties" test,18 1 the new statutory provisions gov-
erning area variances take a bold step backwards to Wach-
sberger v. Michalis 82 and its relatively easy guides for consider-
ation by boards of appeals. 8 There are five factors for the
board to consider in balancing these interests:
1.Whether an undesirable change will be produced in the char-
acter of the neighborhood or a detriment to nearby properties
will be created by the grant of the variance;"8 4
2.Whether the benefit sought by the applicant can be achieved
by some feasible method other than a variance;88
174. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)(2); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b)(2).
175. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)(3); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b)(3).
176. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)(4); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b)(4).
177. Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
178. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3).
179. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3).
180. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
182. 19 Misc. 2d 909, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 921, 238
N.Y.S.2d 309 (2d Dep't 1963).
183. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
184. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b)(1); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b)(1). See
also Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
185. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b)(2); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b)(2). See
also Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
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3. Whether the requested variance is substantial;"s6
4.Whether the proposed variance will have an adverse effect or
impact on the physical or environmental conditions in the
neighborhood or district;"8 7
5.Whether the alleged difficulty was self-created, however, this
will not necessarily preclude the granting of the area
variance.'88
The new statutes also include the following changes:
" an express authorization for boards of appeals to impose con-
ditions to minimize the impact of use or area variances;' 9
* clarification of the power to interpret the zoning
regulations; '
* a specific cross-reference to the referral requirements of Gen-
eral Municipal Law, section 239-m;' 9 '
* a specific cross-reference to the requirements of SEQRA; 192
* provision is made for three-member or five-member boards
of appeals;'" 3
* the time within which appeals must be taken to the board of
appeals is prescribed in the statute (60 days) instead of leav-
ing it to the rules of the board of appeals;' 94
" zoning boards of appeals hearings in both towns and villages
must be- preceded by at least five days notice published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the municipality (instead
186. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b)(3); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b)(3). See
also Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
187. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b)(4); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b)(4). See
also Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
188. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(3)(b)(5); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(3)(b)(5). See
also Coon & Damsky, supra note 170, at 1.
189. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(4); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(4).
190. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(1); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(1).
191. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(10); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(10). These sections
require the board of appeals to send notice at least five days before a hearing to the
parties, to the regional state park commission having jurisdiction over any park within
five hundred feet of the property affected by the appeal, and to the county, metropolitan
or regional planning agency. The notice shall be accompanied by a full statement of the
matter under consideration. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(10); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-
a(10).
192. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(11); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(11). These sections
require the board to comply with the provisions of the state environmental quality re-
view act.
193. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(2); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712(2).
194. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(5); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(5).
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of the official newspaper). 195
It must be noted that while the above discussion concerns
zoning boards of appeals in towns and villages, a bill currently
before the State Legislature would enact the same provisions
into the General City Law."" Also, Chapter 248 of the Laws of
1992 made a number of technical changes to the zoning board of
appeals legislation. 9 '
C. 1992
While the Recodification Project achieved a good deal of
success in 1991, the impetus of the Project, its recognition by
the legislature, and the overwhelming support from local govern-
ments all helped to make the following year particularly gratify-
ing. The 1992 legislative session was especially productive with
respect to changes to the zoning and planning statutes. No fewer
than eight measures were passed by the legislature - all of
which resulted from the ongoing efforts of the Commission to
recodify the enabling statutes.'98 A brief summary of each of
these enactments follows.
1. Incentive Zoning for Cities
As previously noted,' 99 this measure '00 adds a new section
81-b to the General City Law, to give cities identical authority
concerning incentive zoning, as was given to towns and vil-
lages."0' The bill became effective immediately. 02
195. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(7); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(7). See generally
Coon and Damsky, supra note 170, at 1-2 for a discussion of the new statutory provisions
in Town Law sections 267-a and 267-b and Village Law sections 7-712-a and 7-712-b.
196. A. 4865, 215th General Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993).
197. See Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 248, sec. 1-14, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 927-30 (codi-
fied as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 267(1), (2), (9), 267-a(2), (3), (4), (5), (7), 267-
b(1), (2)(a), (3)(a), (4), 267-c(1), (4)), sec. 15-29, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 930-33 (codified as
amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-712(1), (2), (4), (9), 7-712-a(2), (3), (4), (5), (7), 7-
712-b(1), (2)(a), (3)(a), (4), 7-712-c(1), (4)).
198. See infra notes 199-265 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
200. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 247, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 925, 925-27 (codified at
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-b).
201. Id.; see N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-703 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
202. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 247, sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 925, 927.
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2. Zoning Boards of Appeals - Technical Changes
As also previously noted,0 3 this legislation,20 ' which became
effective on July 1, 1992, made a number of technical changes to
the Town and Village Law zoning board of appeals legislation of
the previous year.20 5 Among the changes is one which would au-
thorize town boards and village boards of trustees to require
training for zoning board of appeals members, and to provide for
their removal for failure to complete the local training require-
ments.20 6 Among the other changes are the following:
* decisions of the board are to be filed in the town or village
clerk's office within 5 business days, instead of
"immediately". 27
* it is now clear that conditions imposed by a board of appeals
when granting variances may relate to the proposed use of the
property, or to the duration of the variance or both.2 "
* for village boards of appeals members, the terms of office are
geared to the village official year, instead of the calendar
year.2 0
9
3. Cluster Development Projects in Two or More Districts.
This measure210  amends General City Law section 37,211
Town Law section 281,212 and Village Law section 7-738,213 with
203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
204. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 248, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927.
205. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
206. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 248, sec. 2-3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 928 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(2), (9)), sec. 16, 18, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 930, 931
(codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712(2), (9)).
207. Id. sec. 4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 928 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 267-a(2)), sec. 19, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 931 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-712-a(2)).
208. Id. sec. 12, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 929 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 267-b(4)), sec. 27, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 932 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-712-b(4)).
209. Id. sec. 17, 1992 N.Y. Laws 927, 930-31 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-712(4)).
210. Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 230, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905.
211. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905, 906 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW
§ 37 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
212. Id. sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905, 906-07 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 281 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
213. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905, 907-08 (codified as amended at N.Y. VILLAGE
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respect to planning board approval of cluster development
projects that lie in more than one zoning district.214 In such cir-
cumstances, the new laws allow planning boards to cluster all
the development allowable onto any portion of the tract.215 The
effective date was July 1, 1992.210
4. Site Plan Approval
This is a new measure of major significance, which became
effective July 1, 1993.217 It repealed Town Law section 274-a2 18
and Village Law section 7-725,219 with respect to planning board
approval of site plans and special use permits. It replaced those
sections with new Town Law section 274-a220 and new Village
Law section 7-725-a, 21 which provide for site plan approval, and
new Town Law section 274-b, and new Village Law section 7-
725-b, 23 which provide for special use permits. The new sections
provide for review procedures for site plans and special use per-
mits that would be used by whatever board is designated as the
review agency (planning board, zoning board of appeals or an-
other board).224
An important new provision allows towns and villages to re-
quire developers to provide land for park or recreational pur-
poses, or cash in lieu of the land, as a condition of approval of
residential site plans.225 The new site plan sections provide more
LAW 7-738 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
214. Id. sec. 1-3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905, 905-08.
215. Id.
216. Id. sec. 4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 905, 908.
217. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 694, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807.
218. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1807.
219. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1811.
220. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1807-09 (codified at N.Y. TowN LAW § 274-a
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
221. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1811-13 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
725-a (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
222. Id. sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1809-11 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-b
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
223. Id. sec. 4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1813-14 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
725-b (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
224. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
225. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 694, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1807-09 (codified at
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a(6)(a), (c)), sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1812 (codified at N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-a(6)(a), (c)).
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clearly than the existing law that the uses subject to site plan
approval and the site plan approval criteria must be set forth in
the municipality's zoning ordinance or local law.226 In addition,
the new site plan and special use permit statutes include the fol-
lowing provisions:
" specific authorization for the approving board to impose rea-
sonable conditions when approving site plans or special use
permits.22 
7
" specific authorization for the local governing body to provide,
in its ordinance or local law, for waiver of its site plan or spe-
cial use permit requirements under certain circumstances, thus
providing a parallel to the subdivision approval process.2 2
" that public hearings on site plans remain optional; they are
not required under the new statute but may be required by the
municipal ordinance or local law.22
* that public hearings on special use permits are to be
required.2 30
" cross references to SEQRA"' and to the referral requirements
of General Municipal Law section 239-M. 212
5. Subdivision Approval
This important measure, which became effective July 1,
1993,2"3 repealed the town and village subdivision approval stat-
utes and enacted brand-new provisions (Town Law sections
276234 and 277;235 Village Law sections 7-728236 and 7-73027). Or-
226. Id. sec. 1-2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1808, 1810 (codified as amended at N.Y.
TOWN LAW §§ 274-a(2)(a), 274-b(2)), sec. 4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1807, 1813 (codified at N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-b(2)).
227. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 274-a(4), 274-b(4); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-725-a(4), 7-725-
b(4).
228. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 274-a(5), 274-b(5); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-725-a(5), 7-725-
b(5).
229. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a(7); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-a(7).
230. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-b(6); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-b(6).
231. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 274-a(9), 274-b(8); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-725-a(9), 7-725-
b(8).
232. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 274-a(8), 274-b(7); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7-725-a(8), 7-725-
b(7).
233. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 727, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960.
234. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1960-63 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
235. Id. sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1963-67 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277
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ganization of the statutes is now simpler and easier to follow.
Also, Town Law and Village Law provisions are now identical.1
38
Time limits for planning board actions are changed, so that in
both towns and villages, there must be a public hearing within
sixty-two days after receipt of a complete preliminary plat,'23 9 or
final plat if no preliminary plat is required, with the decision
within sixty-two days after the hearing.240 Default approval pro-
visions remain. 41 Cross reference to SEQRA 42 and to the refer-
ral requirements of General Municipal Law section 239-n are in-
cluded. '43 The new statutes incorporate guidelines for planning
boards to follow in determining whether to require park land or
cash in lieu thereof2"4 (the guidelines are based, almost verba-
tim, on the Court of Appeals' 1990 decision in Bayswater Realty
v. Planning Bd.). 24 5 The measure also broadens the kinds of se-
curity that may be required from developers to insure proper
installation of improvements.4 6
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
236. Id. sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1968-71 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
237. Id. sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1971-74 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
238. See supra notes 234-37.
239. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 727, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1961 (codified at N.Y.
TOWN LAW § 276(5)(b), (c)), sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1969 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 7-728(5)(b), (c)).
240. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1961-62 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 276(6)(b)), sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1969 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
728(6)(b)).
241. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1962 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(6)(f)),
sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1970 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728(6)(f)).
242. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1963 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(13)),
sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1971 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728(13)).
243. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1963 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(10)),
sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1971 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-728(10)).
244. Id. sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1964 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(4)),
sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1972 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730(4)).
245. 76 N.Y.2d 460, 560 N.E.2d 1300, 560 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1990).
246. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 727, sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1965 (codified at N.Y.
TOWN LAW § 277(9)), sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1973 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-730(9)).
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6. Creation of Planning Boards
This measure, which became effective July 1, 1993,2'47 con-
solidated in one section in the Town Law and one in the Village
law, all provisions concerning the creation of planning boards,
appointment of members and the general advisory powers of
such boards.248 The measure provides for the creation of new
planning boards by local law, rather than by resolution.4 9 It also
provides that the subject matter of planning board regulations,
such as subdivision regulations, must be adopted by local law.2 50
The measure would also allow town boards and village boards of
trustees to require training for planning board members, and to
provide for their removal for failure to complete the local train-
ing requirements.251
7. Agricultural Districts and Land Use Regulation
This measure, which became effective July 1, 1993,252 added
new Town Law section 283-a 253 and new Village Law section 7-
741254 which require applicants for certain land use approvals to
provide "agricultural data statements" for use by reviewing
agencies.2 55 It applies to applications for special permits, use
variances, site plan approval and subdivision approval for prop-
erty within an agricultural district containing a farm operation
or on property with boundaries within 500 feet of a farm opera-
tion in an agricultural district.25 The agricultural data state-
247. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 663, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749.
248. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 663, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1749-51 (codified at
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 271 (McKinney Supp. 1993)), sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1751-52
(codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-718 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
249. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1749 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 271(1)),
sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1751 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-718(1)).
250. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1750 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 271(13)),
sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1752 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-718(10)).
251. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1749, 1750 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 271(1), (9)), sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1749, 1751 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
718(1), (6)).
252. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 534, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523.
253. Id. sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1525 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 283-a (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1993)).
254. Id. sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1525-26 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
255. See supra notes 253-54.
256. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 534, sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1525 (codified at N.Y.
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ment would contain information identifying farm operations so
that reviewing boards would be aware of their proximity.157 The
measure also amended General Municipal Law sections 239-m
and 239-n to require referrals under those sections of special use
permits, use variances, site plans and subdivision plats within
500 feet from the boundary of farm operations within agricul-
tural districts.258
8. Intermunicipal Cooperation in Planning and Land Use
Regulation
This measure, which became effective July 31, 1992,259
added new Town Law section 284,260 Village Law section 7-
741,21 and General City Law section 20-g, 26 2 to encourage mu-
nicipalities to use their powers to undertake cooperative efforts
for planning and local land use regulations.263 It complements
the broad authority municipalities have under General Munici-
pal Law article 5-G to enter into agreements for joint activi-
ties.28 4 The measure specifies examples of intermunicipal cooper-
ation that are possible, including joint planning boards or zoning
boards of appeals, and the joint preparation of comprehensive
plans.26 5
With the enactment of the eight new statutes mentioned
above, some old and familiar sections have been renumbered.
TOWN LAW § 283-a(2)), sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1526 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-741(2)).
257. Id. sec. 5, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1525 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 283-a(4)),
sec. 6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1526 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(4)).
258. Id. sec. 7-8, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1523, 1526-27 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW §§ 239-m, 239-n).
259. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 724, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952.
260. Id. sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1952-53 (codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 284
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
261. Id. sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1953-55 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
262. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1955-57 (codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
263. See supra notes 260-62.
264. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-m (McKinney 1986).
265. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 724, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1953 (codified at N.Y.
TOWN LAW § 284(4)), sec. 2, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1954 (codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-741(4)), sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1956 (codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-
g(4)).
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Thus, Town Law section 281, concerning cluster development,
has been renumbered as Town Law Section 278, effective July 1,
1993.216 Town Law section 278, concerning recording of plats,
has become section 279;267 Town Law section 279, covering per-
mits for buildings in the bed of mapped streets, has become sec-
tion 280;26s and Town Law section 280, concerning municipal
improvements in streets, has become section 281.269 All of these
changes became effective July 1, 1993.27 The separability clause,
Town Law section 284, became section 285, effective July 31,
1992.271 No renumberings affect the Village Law.
D. 1993
1. Use Variance - Redefinition
A number of Commission proposals were enacted into law
during the 1993 session of the legislature and become effective
on July 1, 1994,272 including one2 3 which made a major change
to the law enacted the previous year27 4 relating to use variances.
Although the Commission staff and the Advisory Committee
were satisfied with the "depri[vation] of all economic use" clause
contained in the 1991 amendment,2 75 objections to the "harsh-
ness" of the amendment arose almost immediately after the new
266. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 727, sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1967 (codified as
amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 278 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
267. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1967 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 279 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
268. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1967 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 280 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
269. Id. sec. 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1967 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 281 (McKinney Supp. 1993)).
270. Id. sec. 7, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1960, 1974.
271. Act of July 31, 1992, ch. 724, sec. 1, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1952 (codified at N.Y
TOWN LAW § 285 (McKinney Supp. 1993)), sec. 4, 1992 N.Y. Laws 1952, 1957.
272. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 208, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593 (S. 2917-A, A. 4865-A); Act of
July 6, 1993, ch. 209, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600 (S. 2918-B, A. 4867-B); Act of July 6, 1993, ch.
211, 1993 N.Y. Laws 604 (S. 3201-A, A. 5475-A); Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 242, 1993 N.Y.
Laws 648 (S. 3203-B, A. 5476-B); Act of July 13, 1993, ch. 257, 1993 N.Y. Laws 701 (S.
3031-A, A. 5121-A); Act of July 28, 1993, ch. 544, 1993 N.Y. Laws 1313 (S. 3028-B, A.
5124-B).
273. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 208, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 593-94 (to be codified
at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81).
274. Act of Aug. 2. 1991, ch. 692, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364. See supra notes 164-65.
275. See Act of Aug. 2 1991, ch. 692, sec. 3, 1991 N.Y. Laws 1364, 1367 (codified at
N.Y. TowN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)).
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provisions were signed into law.
Bowing to this reaction, the 1991 Town Law 7' and Village
Law277 were amended in 1993,278 as part of a bill which primarily
amended the General City Law. The 1993 amendment to the
General City Law279 essentially tracked the 1991 legislation con-
cerning zoning boards of appeals.2 80 The amendment modified
the "all economic use" language of the 1991 amendment to pro-
vide that an applicant can obtain a use variance if he "cannot
realize a reasonable return, provided that the lack of return is
substantial as demonstrated by competent financial evidence. "281
2. Zoning board of Appeals - Rehearing Provisions
Along with the use variance modifications, the 1993 amend-
ments to the Town Law and Village Law sections also reinstated
the rehearing provisions which had been deleted in 1991, and
made a few technical changes.28 2 It is important to note that for
the first time the zoning board of appeals provisions of the Town
Law, Village Law and General City Law (which are not applica-
ble to New York City) are substantially identical. ss
3. County Review of Local Actions
Section 239-m of the General Municipal Law was amended
in 1993 to make the provisions affecting county review of local
land use actions easier to read.28  Another interesting change in
276. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b.
277. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(1).
278. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 208, sec. 9, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 598 (to be codified at
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b), sec. 14, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 599-600 (to be codified at N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b).
279. Id. sec. 1-5, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 593-97 (to be codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW
§§ 81, 81-a, 81-b, 81-c, 81-e).
280. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
281. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 208, sec. 9, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 598 (to be codified at
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b)(1)), sec. 14, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 599 (to be codified at
N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b(2)(b)(1)).
282. Id. sec. 8, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 598 (to be codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-
a(12)), sec. 13, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 599 (to be codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-
a(12)). Rehearing provisions were also reinstated in the General City Law. Id. sec. 2,
1993 N.Y. Laws 593, 595-96 (to be codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-a(12)).
283. See Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 208, 1993 N.Y. Laws 593.
284. Act of July 28, 1993, ch. 544, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 1313, 1313-15 (to be codi-
fied at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-m).
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the 1993 amendment provides that if the county or regional
agency report is not received by the local referring agency within
the period agreed upon, but prior to final action by the referring
agency, the report is subject to the present majority-plus-one
voting requirements should the local referring agency wish to
override the county or regional planning agency.
285
4. Subdivision - Deed Filing Requirements
Section 333 of the Real Property Law was amended to pro-
vide that any deed conveying real property may be accepted for
recording by a county clerk only if accompanied by a properly
completed state board of equalization and assessment form,
which calls for information regarding subdivision approval.2 86 As
part of the same act, section 574 of the Real Property Tax Law
was amended to require that certain technical information be
furnished by county recording officers to county assessors, the
county equalization agency and to the state board of
equalization.287
5. County-Local Cooperation in Planning
Section 20-g of the General City Law,28 8 section 284 of theTown Law 289 and section 7-741 of the Village Law290 were
amended to allow counties to participate in agreements relating
to intermunicipal cooperation in comprehensive planning and
the administration of land use regulations.291
285. Id. sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 1313, 1315 (to be codified at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW
§ 239-m(4)(b), (5)).
286. Act of July 13, 1993, ch. 257, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 701, 701-02 (to be codified
at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 333(1-e)).
287. Id. sec. 4, 1993 N.Y. Laws 701, 702-03 (to be codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 574(1)).
288. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 242, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 648, 648-49 (to be codified
at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(1), (2), (3), (4)).
289. Id. sec. 2, 1993 N.Y. Laws 648, 650-51 (to be codified at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 284(1), (2), (3), (4)).
290. Id. sec. 3, 1993 N.Y. Laws 648, 651-52 (to be codified at N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-
741(1), (2), (3), (4)).
291. See supra notes 288-90.
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6. City Planning Board Functions - Technical Changes
The General City Law sections relating to planning boards,
special permits, and site plan review were also amended in
1993.92 The new law combines a number of existing provi-
sions ' 93 into one new section (section 27), which addresses the
basic structure of city planning boards and their functions, pow-
ers and duties. '94 The law also makes certain technical amend-
ments to the comparable Town Law and Village Law sections '95
which are necessary to achieve consistency with the new General
City law provisions.
7. Defining the Comprehensive Plan
In all of our years dealing with land use matters, we have
never found any serious opposition to the concept of compre-
hensive planning; nor do we know of any great amount of disa-
greement over the principle that many land use problems simply
do not stop at the boundaries of each local government in the
state. Until this year, however, Commission staff proposals deal-
ing with a comprehensive plan bill have run into constant, and
vocal, opposition. The proposals have been changed, almost on a
monthly basis, for over three years. At the 1992 legislative ses-
sion, many letters and phone calls were received, each carrying
the same message: the comprehensive plan proposal 96 is con-
trary to present statutory provisions and case law. Of course, the
proposal is contrary to statute and case law. The statutes simply
say that all zoning must be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan;2 97 case law usually finds that a certain zoning action was
not in accordance with a comprehensive plan, rather than defin-
292. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 211, sec. 1-3, 1993 N.Y. Laws 604, 604-09 (to be codified
at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 27, 27-a, 27-b).
293. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 27, 28, 30, 30-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993).
294. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 211, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 604, 604-06 (to be codified
at N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 27).
295. Id. sec. 4, 1993 N.Y. Laws 604, 609-10 (codified as amended at N.Y. TOWN LAW
§ 271(1), (2), (6)), sec. 5-6, 1993 N.Y. Laws 604, 610 (codified as amended at N.Y. VIL-
LAGE LAW § 7-718(1), (6)).
296. S. 2918-B, A. 4867-B, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (enacted by Act of July 6, 1993, ch.
209, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600).
297. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1993).
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ing what a comprehensive plan is, or should be, and measuring a
certain action against this definition.298
While we cannot conceive that a municipality, or a munici-
pal attorney, called upon in court to defend a land use action
against a charge of non-accordance with a comprehensive plan
would not rather rely on a written document, no matter how
brief or how simple, rather than attempting to produce a nebu-
lous record of meetings, conferences, consultant's reports and
the like, our conception is hardly held in universal agreement.
The basic problem does not appear to be widespread objection
to comprehensive planning, but rather to a written plan, which
seems to raise the specter of "state mandate" and even worse,
"unfunded state mandate." Anyone involved in planning and
zoning knows of the efforts presently being undertaken by
groups, organizations, academic institutions and others to foster
a regional approach to planning and true comprehensive plan-
ning. We have been given the opportunity to review literally
dozens of documents and suggestions, many of which are both
well thought out and workable, but still all of these efforts are
thwarted by the opposition to a state statute defining a compre-
hensive plan, which is to be embodied in a written document.
Finally, this year, the legislature passed, and the Governor
signed into law, a bill that provides a formal, legislative defini-
tion of the comprehensive plan to which zoning must conform.299
The new definition of a comprehensive plan is one paragraph
long, is followed by an illustrative list of 15 topics that may be
covered in the plan, and expresses the legislature's intent to
place more emphasis on comprehensive planning.300 While the
law contains no actual operative or procedural provisions, it rep-
resents, for the first time, something other than the rubric "all
zoning must be in accordance with a comprehensive plan," and
provides a foundation for future amendments that may result in
298. See, e.g., Udell v. Hass, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968); Place v. Hack, 34 Misc. 2d 777, 230 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See supra
notes 54, 56 and accompanying text.
299. Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 209, sec. 1, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600, 600-01 (to be codified
at N.Y. ToWN LAW § 272-a), sec. 2, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600, 601-02 (to be codified at N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-722), sec. 3, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600, 602-03 (to be codified at N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAW § 28-a).
300. See Act of July 6, 1993, ch. 209, 1993 N.Y. Laws 600.
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comprehensive plan legislation that has been so desperately
needed since the inception of the original zoning statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Much remains to be done in improving the substantive re-
quirements for land use planning, providing for formal training
of local zoning and planning officials, and continuing to refine
the organization, readability and consistency of the state's land
use law. As this article demonstrates, however, Senator Charles
D. Cook and the other members of the Commission, together
with the efforts of Executive Director, Ronald C. Bauch, Com-
mission Staff and the Statewide Advisory Committee on Land
Use Statutes have made a major contribution to land use plan-
ning and zoning in New York State by launching and sustaining
this multi-year legislative reform effort.
43
